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Since the market-oriented reforms of Deng 
Xiaoping, China has consistently been increasing 
its economic interconnectedness with the outside 
world. The amount of goods flowing both to and 
from China is enormous and continues to grow. 
In 2010, China surpassed Japan as the second 
largest economy in the world. With an annual 
GDP growth rate averaging at approximately 10 
percent, and a highly adaptable, growth-oriented 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), one may only 
roughly estimate the limits of China’s future 
economic strength. This growth has caused China 
to seek certain goods from abroad for new 
economic developments in both exportation and 
domestic consumption. In recent years, China’s 
economic growth has led it to engage in 
meaningful contact with Latin America. As a net 
importer of primary products, China’s chief 
reason for involvement in Latin America is for its 
primary products. China’s expansion abroad is 
driven by economic reasons, with international 
politics being a means to greater economic gain. 
As with its dealings in other countries, China 
approaches Latin American countries with 
pragmatic, state-specific strategies, playing to the 
economic and political climates of its partners in 
order to access much needed natural resources. 
China’s foreign policy is driven mainly by 
economic concerns and with little ideological 
content, making China a new and powerful player 
in the international scene. 
Roughly around the turn of the century, 
exports from Latin America to China began to 
climb dramatically (see fig 1). This growth has 
continued into the present. The majority of 
these exports are primary products, which 
include minerals, fuel, and agricultural 
products. 
 
 The fundamentals for China’s interest in 
Latin America are clear. China has the world’s 
largest population, with over 1.3 billion people. 
China’s economy has steadily been rising with 
an annual GDP growth rate of over 10 percent 
since 1978.ii China’s natural resource 
production is not great enough to support the 
speed of its economic growth. China is 
therefore a net importer of minerals, fuel, and 
agricultural goods. At the same time, China’s 
economic growth has also been export-driven 
(see fig 2). China’s growth in exports has 
exceeded that of every other nation on earth. 
With an export-driven economy, China has 
been able to make leaps and bounds in its 
economic development. 
 
Economic Drivers of China’s Natural 
Resource Demand 
 
In the early stages of China’s rapid growth, 
products that China exported were mostly cheap, 
low value-added goods. More recently, however, 
China’s exports have become high-tech, high 
value-added products. In 2006, China surpassed 
the United States, the EU-27, and Japan to 
become the largest high- tech exporter in the 
world. Its high-tech exports grew 33 percent 
annually from 1995 to 2008, much faster than 
the growth of overall exports.
iii These new 
products necessitate vast quantities of primary 
products including minerals and fuel, the 
products that Latin America has in abundance, 
and the leading cause for China’s aggressive 














The Chinese leadership works to maintain 
its ambitious economic growth even with its 
relatively low per capita levels of natural 
resources. Over the past 18 years, China has 
become a net importer of almost all major 
natural resources. In 1993, China became a net 
importer of oil. From 1995 and 2005, its oil 
imports multiplied by a factor of five, becoming 
the second largest consumer of oil. During the 
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same time period, imports of iron ore grew 570 
percent, copper by 738 percent, cobalt by 4,145 
percent, and aluminum by 2,246 percent China 
has looked to the developing world for these 
products. China has developed into an exporter 
of high-tech products through its investment in 
education.vi 
In the decade ending in 2004, enrollment in 
higher education rose by a factor of 5, exceeding 
13 percent of the college-age population.vii 
Although percentagewise this is not a huge 
number, in absolute terms it means that China 
has over 2.4 million graduates per year, showing 
no signs of ebbing. Furthermore, China’s 
education is dominated by students of science 
and engineering- two subjects crucial to the 
development of high-tech industries and key to 
China’s future growth.viii 
Investments in infrastructure and research 
and development are also signs that China’s 
growth will be long-lasting. China spends at 
least 1.2 percent of its GDP on research and 
development, more than any Latin American 
country.ix By 2020, the CCP has a formal goal of 
making it 2.2 percent of GDP, with its main 
objective to have 60 percent of the country’s 
economic growth driven by science and 
technology by 2020.x China’s investment in 
fixed assets is about 40 percent of GDP, twice 
that of the Latin American average.xi This 
investment means better roads, better access to 
electricity, and better telephone land lines; all 
crucial to future economic growth.xii 
Its investment in research and development 
and internal infrastructure are powered by its 
access to cheap bank credit. China’s people save 
extraordinary amounts of money. Their savings 
rate is approximately 50 percent of China’s 
GDP. This offers the Chinese government access 
to cheap credit. Provided with this capital, China 
can develop forward looking economic 
developments. 
China’s demand for foreign natural 
resources will continue along with its economic 
advancement. China’s booming railway 
construction, shipbuilding, and automobile 
manufacturing sectors are all natural resource-
intensive industries, necessitating primary 
products such as metals, rubber, fuel, etc. 
Ownership of domestically produced 
automobiles has sky rocketed. In China, car 
ownership more than doubled between 2004 and 
2009, from 12 percent of the population to 28. 
One report concludes that it is possible for car 
ownership to top 50 percent of the population by 
2015.xiii Growth in Chinese domestic 
consumption continues to drive its need for 
foreign natural resources, making China and 
Latin America complementary partners. 
With this economic growth has come a 
higher standard of living for most Chinese, who 
now demand more agricultural products from 
abroad. China is by no means a food insecure 
country; however, there are some agricultural 
products that China cannot sufficiently supply to 
its own people. While China is a major producer 
of many agricultural products, overall it is a net 
importer of bulk food commodities. China has 
become a major market for imports of oilseeds 
(ie. soybeans), vegetable oils, oil meal, and 
grain.xiv 
 
China’s Access to Latin American Natural 
Resources 
 
Latin America offers vast amounts of 
agricultural products, metals, and fuel. Latin 
America’s agricultural land per capita is three 
times greater than China’s while forest land and 
fresh water per capita is more than five times 
greater. Latin America produces about 50 percent 
of the world’s soybeans, over 20 percent of global 
refined aluminum, 20 percent of the world’s zinc, 
30 percent of the world’s oilseeds, 40 percent of 
the world’s copper 




 Latin America’s economic environment is 
complementary to China’s. China has increased 
its exports of high-tech products from 
approximately 3 percent of total exports in 1990 
to approximately 33 percent in 2004 (see fig 3). 
Meanwhile, Latin America’s economy has 
continued to rely on the exports of primary 
products. Since China’s new high-tech industries 
are natural resource-intensive, Latin America’s 
economy is complementary to China’s. China’s 
imports from Latin America have shown 


























These natural resources, however, are not 
found in significant quantities in every Latin 
American country. The bulk of the exports from 
Latin America to China has been heavily 
concentrated in the few countries that contain the 
primary products that China demands. In 2008, 
while the total volume of Latin American exports 
to China accounted for only 5.6 percent of the 
region’s overall exports, for a number of 
countries in South America, China has become 
their top export customer, including Chile and 
Brazil’s. China has become the second most 
important export customer for Argentina, Peru, 
Costa Rica, and Cuba.
xx By 2008, just 10 
commodities in only six Latin American 
countries accounted for 74 percent of the region’s 
exports to China.
xxi These same 10 commodities 
made up 91 percent of the region’s overall 
commodity exports to China.xxii China’s 
expansion in trade with Latin America has 
primarily involved those countries with large 
amounts of natural resources. 
These states that China is engaging are 
adapting their economies to meet China’s 
demands. For example, China has had a profound 
impact on Latin American soybean production. 
Soybeans and soybean-derived products are an 
important part of the Chinese diet and are used 
for soy flour, soymilk, soybean oil, tofu, textured 
vegetable proteins, and soy sauce.
xxiii China 
consumes about 40 million tons of soybeans 
annually, and it is predicted that China may soon 
import over 50 percent of the world’s soybean 
production. Brazil and Argentina are two of the 
largest soya producers in the world. In 2009, 
China surpassed the U.S. as Brazil’s most 
important trading partner. Argentina now devotes 
over half of its farmable land to the production of 
soybeans.
xxiv China’s economic demands now 
determine economic production in large Latin 
American economies. 
While the physical distance between Latin 
America and China is long and inhibitory to 
trade, developments are in place to facilitate 
commerce. Already under construction is a $5.25 
billion expansion to the Panama Canal that will 
add an extra lane and two sets of locks, tripling 
cargo capacity through the canal, and allowing 
China to have easier access to Latin America’s 
eastern countries. China will be able to use its 
large, more efficient cargo vessels to transport 
raw materials from northeastern Latin America, 
particularly Brazil for iron ore and Venezuela for 
oil. Construction of the additional parts to the 
canal are projected to be completed by 2014.
xxv 
Another possibility for linking the eastern Latin 
American economies to the Pacific is through a 
proposed “dry canal” through Colombia. China 
and Colombia are in advanced talks to develop a 
$ 7.6 billion 791 kilometer railway through 
Colombia.
xxvi These talks represent China’s 
aggressive push for greater access to Latin 
American natural resources. 
 
China’s Engagement with Latin America  
 
China engages natural resource-rich Latin 
American trading partners regardless of their 
political environment or the ideologies of their 
governments. Its interactions with Latin 
American countries are dependent on economic 
opportunities. In market-oriented countries, it has 
signed several Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). 
For example, China signed a FTA with Chile in 
2006, with Peru in 2009, and with Costa Rica in 
2010. China has also engaged Colombia for a 
FTA.
xxvii In socialist, revolutionary countries 
found in Latin America, China has engaged them 
in state-level economic developments. The 
leaders of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua 
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have all increased their anti-American rhetoric, 
turning to China as alternative leader in the 
region. China has not shied away from business 
opportunities with the revolutionary governments 
of these countries. Its opportunistic play on Latin 
America’s domestic politics is conducive to its 
economic advancement in the region. 
 
Other Chinese Concerns in Latin America  
 
Besides China’s interest in Latin American 
exports, it also works to open markets for the sale 
of Chinese goods. Although Chinese firms seek to 
sell their products to any country they can, Latin 
America is particularly important for a number of 
reasons. First, China would like to diversify its 
export base. China relies mainly on developed 
nations for the purchasing of their goods. With 
the economic crisis of 2008 and the contraction of 
consumption by developed nations, China 
recognizes the need to diversify its export base to 
middle-income economies as a way to further 
guarantee the advancement of its economic 
goals.
xxviii The growth of Chinese goods being 
imported to Latin America coincides with and is 
comparable to that of Latin American goods 
exported to China (see fig 5). 
Latin Americans are important consumers 
for knock-off products of things like designer 
clothing, pirated music CDs, DVDs, footwear, 
and other products.
xxx While this kind of trade is 
illegal, many customs authorities are not able to 
block the entry of these products or their sale, 
because these organizations are often under 
resourced, corrupt, or overwhelmed by the 
volume of products.
xxxi Products like computers, 
motorcycles, and cars from China are much 
cheaper than those from the developed world. 
While these products are often lower quality,  
many Latin Americans cannot afford products 
from developed countries. Therefore, “Latin 
America, with a population of over 500 million 
and an economy of nearly $3 trillion is an 
attractive market for Chinese products.”
xxxii By 
selling low quality, and even illegal goods, the 
Chinese make economic gains from exporting to 
Latin America.  
China engages countries for economic 
purposes, with ideological concerns only being a 
secondary matter. However, there is one 
exception to this rule. This exception pertains to 
the extension of its “One China Policy,” or the 
diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. Some countries in 
the region still recognize Taiwan’s independence. 
However, these countries are not large natural 
resource producers, so they are not economically 
significant to China. The countries that recognize 
Taiwan’s independence are mostly located in 
Central America and the Caribbean, and do not 
serve as highly important natural resource 
providers to the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). China uses its economic might to gain 
adherents to its policy. For example, it gave $11 
million in aid in 2005 to the Commonwealth of 
Dominica and a $100 million grant over the next 
six years in return for its recognition of the PRC. 
The isolation of Taiwan in Latin America is 
China’s main political concern; however, it does 
not significantly effect China’s economic goals, 
and its economic expansion into Latin America is 
not to isolate Taiwan.
xxxiii China’s government’s 
main goal in Latin America is for natural 
resources. 
 
China’s Government Facilitates Expansion 
 
China’s government works to facilitate the 
acquisition of foreign natural resources while 
maintaining oversight of this crucial sector of the 
economy. The CCP has reacted to China’s 
dependence on foreign natural resources in two 
ways. Firstly, it has opened its markets to foreign 
suppliers by lifting quantitative restrictions on 
almost all commodities and by curtailing import 
subsidies.
xxxiv Secondly, because they realize the 
strategic importance of these commodities, 
leaders in the government have worked to 
maintain control over the production and trade of 




 The Chinese government works actively to 
increase China’s natural resource acquisition 
throughout the world. It supports and advances 
SOEs specializing in natural resources in order to 
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keep oversight and control over the trade of these 
commodities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Commerce oversee the 
execution of national policy governing natural 
resources, with the exception being over oil. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Commerce are funded by the Ministry of Finance, 
which provides cheap credit for the companies’ 
acquisition of natural resources. The oil trade is 
supervised by the Energy Leading Group. 
Because of the increased security importance of 
oil, the Energy Leading group is chaired directly 
by the Prime Minister. China’s government has a 




 The Chinese government knows that natural 
resources are connected to national security and 
international politics. China has been 
discriminated against in its quest for natural 
resources in Canada and the United States 
because of both security and nationalistic 
reasons.
xxxvii The natural resource markets are 
strategic and can be volatile in times of 
international crisis. It therefore behooves all 
governments to work to ensure a diversified 
portfolio of natural resource access. China 
continues to diversify its sources of natural 
resources. 
 China’s foreign policy is sometimes 
controversial because of its seeming lack of moral 
guidance. In Africa, it is notorious for doing 
business with the worst of governments, in 
countries where most Western companies will not 
even enter because of humanitarian concerns. An 
example of this is in Sudan, where China has 
millions of dollars invested in the oil sector, and 
has worked to ensure “stability,” by blocking 
U.N. military action to stop the genocide 
occurring there. While the West is steering clear 
of Africa because of humanitarian and political 
concerns, China has swiftly moved in for natural 
resources. It is opportunistic in Africa, working to 
win natural resources where the West does not 
have a strong presence. China uses this same 
pragmatism in Latin America, and is willing to 
adapt its strategy to each country’s political and 
economic concerns. Driven by its desire for 
primary products, China engages each trading 
partner opportunistically. Where China can access 
natural resources through FTAs, China does so, 
but where state-level development projects are 
the only means, China engages on these terms. 
When it comes to natural resource security and 
acquisition, China’s does not take moral, 
political, or ideological concerns into account, 
making it a rational, powerful player in the 
international scene. 
 Fortunately, in recent years, Latin America 
has not been the scene of large-scale human 
rights violations and genocide, as has been the 
case in Africa. However, Latin America has a 
wide range of ideologies, both economic and 
political, in the governments of the particular 
nations. As a rational actor in the international 
scene, China engages these states with 
expedience, with the primary purpose being 
natural resource acquisition. While there are 
numerous examples that demonstrate China’s 
pragmatic, state-specific strategies, China’s 
dealings with Chile and Venezuela are two 
exemplary cases of its adaptability in the region. 
These two countries have seen the greatest 
percent increase in their exports to China (see fig 
6). They have very different governments, 
economic systems, and reasons for increased 
trade with China. Nevertheless, China has made 
extraordinary gains in accessing their most 












China’s engagement with Chile 
 
The historical relationship between China 
and Chile and the recent uptake of Chilean natural 
resources demonstrate how China’s foreign 
policy in Latin America is based mainly on its 
demand for primary products, the most important 
of which is copper. China has supported Chile 
politically in international organizations and its 
leaders have engaged in numerous meaningful 
state visits to Chile. Playing to Chile’s tradition 
of free market economics, China engages Chile 
with free market initiatives. At the same time, 
state level action has been taken in many 
instances for the production and sale of Chilean 
minerals to China. China has successfully gained 
profound interconnectivity with the Chilean 
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economy, gaining access to Chilean minerals by 
political and economic advancement. 
Chile’s geography and abundant mineral 
wealth make it a logical trading partner for 
China. Lining the west coast of South America, 
Chile’s ports serve as intermediate stops for 
many goods flowing between the continent’s 
interior; including Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay; and Pacific-bound 
destinations like China. Ninety-eight percent of 
Chilean exports come from nine primary-
product sectors.
xxxix Chile holds approximately 
17 percent of the world’s copper reserves and 
is the world’s largest producer of the metal. In 
the first half of 2007, over 83 percent of 
Chile’s exports to China were copper.
xl Chile’s 
geographic location and vast natural resources 
make it a crucial partner. 
Chile was the first country in South 
America to establish diplomatic relations with 
China in January of 1971. Recognition of the 
PRC came during the leadership of the Marxist 
president Salvador Allende, who looked to 
China’s Communist regime as a potential 
political and economic partner. The two 
nations engaged in trade; Chile exporting 
mining products, fishmeal, and agricultural 
products, and China selling cheap 
manufactured goods. While formal diplomatic 
relations between Chile and China began 
during the presidency of this leftist, China’s 
reasons for its relations with Chile were less 
about their shared ideology than about China’s 
access to Chile’s resources.
xli
 
With the fall of the Marxist regime in 
Chile, China demonstrated its apathy for 
Chile’s political ideology. In 1973, Allende 
was ousted and the anti-Communist military 
dictator Augusto Pinochet took power, 
establishing a radically anti-Communist 
government. During this phase in Chile, the 
two nations retained economic and diplomatic 
relations with low ideological content.
xlii The 
new regime implemented free-market reforms 
in an attempt to curb inflation and spur 
economic growth, while at the same time 
stifling civil liberties and violating human 
rights. The target of this aggression was 
usually Marxists and others who had left-
leaning tendencies. Pinochet left Chile with a 
legacy of anti- Communistic, free market 
oriented reforms. 
Up until the turn of the century, China and 
Chile’s relations maintained cordial but 
lukewarm.
xliii Changes in Chile’s internal 
government to a more centrist, liberal 
democracy had little bearing on the Sino-
Chilean relationship. Besides Chile’s support 
for China’s membership in the World Trade 
Organization in 1999, the 1990’s showed little 




Since the 1990’s, however, China has 
engaged Chile bilaterally and supported Chile in 
international organizations, coinciding with a 
stark growth in China’s imports of Chilean 
goods. This correlation is no accident, as China 
uses international politics for economic gain. 
Between 1997 and 2006 Sino-Chilean bilateral 
trade increased by 641 percent.
xlv President 
Hu’s visit to Chile in 2004 during the annual 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summit demonstrated the increasing importance 
of Chile and China’s economic relationship. 
China supported Chile’s bid for a nonpermanent 
seat on the United Nations Security Council in 
2003-2004.
xlvi By 2007, the PRC became 
Chile’s most important export customer, and by 
2009 the PRC surpassed the United States as 
Chile’s most important trading partner 
overall.
xlvii China’s political support of Chile 
internationally coincides with increased trade 
between the two. 
Chile’s conservative, free trade tradition 
has served as an opportunity for China to 
increase its economic activity with them. Free 
trade in Chile is a result of the market reforms 
of the post-Allende era. The “Chicago Boys,” a 
group of Chilean economists educated at the 
Chicago School of Economics, influenced 
Chile’s economy by starting free-market 
oriented reforms that have made Chile a pioneer 
in the region. Since 1985, Chile has had an 
average GDP growth of approximately 6.9 
percent.
xlviii Many attribute Chile’s economic 
success to their free trade. In light of Chile’s 
free trade tradition, China has engaged Chile 
with free trade initiatives. 
China increased its access to Chilean 
natural resources through the groundbreaking 
Sino-Chile FTA that went into effect in 2006, 
guaranteeing increased trade and investment 
between the two countries. In October of that 
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year, China lifted tariffs on 2,834 products 
imported from Chile, including its most 
important commodity, copper. Chile gave duty-
free status to 5,891 products from China.
xlix 
Chile’s exports to the PRC jumped 140 percent 
in 2006, the first year in which the FTA went 
into effect.
l The FTA represents China’s first 
ever FTA with any nation outside of Asia. By 
2009, trade between the two nations reached 
record levels at $16.5 billion.
li In signing this 
FTA, the Chinese were able to guarantee greater 
access to the primary products that it needs from 
Chile. 
China has also engaged Chile on a state 
level basis in order to better control the flow of 
Chilean natural resources. In February 2006, 
China and the Chilean copper company 
CODELCO signed an agreement where China 
agreed to purchase Chilean copper at a fixed 
price, providing $550 million in advance to help 
the Chileans increase their output in order to 
keep up with growing Chinese demand.
lii This 
agreement has an estimated value of about $2 
billion.
liii Through state level deals, China is 
able to better coordinate from government to 
government the flow of natural resources. 
The growth of China’s influence on 
Chile’s copper industry has caused concerns of 
Chinese dominance and possible dependency 
for some in Chile. A controversial provision of 
an accord between CODELCO and China 
Minmetals, the Chinese state-owned mineral 
company, was an option for them to buy up to 
49 percent interest in a new Chilean mine, 
Gabriela Mistral. To many Chileans, metals 
and minerals are a national patrimony and the 
possibility of foreign dominance of them 
touches a nationalistic sensitivity.
liv When in 
2007 China Minmetals expressed its interest in 
purchasing 49 percent of the mine, workers in 
one of CODELCO’s leading mines protested, 
causing a sharp reduction in its production.
lv 
The Chilean government decided to forbid the 
Chinese from exercising its option. This 
growing concern by many in Chile shows the 
profundity of China’s presence. 
China’s trillions of dollars in reserves 
allowed it to continue its natural resources 
buying spree from Chile even during the 
Financial Crisis of 2008. In 2008, Chinese 
imports from Chile rose 204.3 percent.
lvi This 
rise was driven by copper. In that year, 
China’s imports of refined copper and alloys 
increased by 640 percent, imports of copper 
waste and scrap went up 716 percent, imports 
of copper ores went up 732 percent, imports of 
copper wire went up 300 percent, and imports 
of other copper products rose at comparative 
levels. While the U.S.’ and Europe’s 
economies were contracting, China’s ability to 
buy Chilean copper increased.
lvii
 
The relationship between these two 
countries has been so lucrative, that in 2010 
the two states began a new phase in the FTA 
to expand their free trade to include greater 
access of service suppliers into a wide array of 
sectors including mining and geological 
prospecting. In August 2010, Mario Artaza, 
head of Asia and Oceania affairs at the 
Chilean foreign ministry said, “since 2005, 
China and Chile have walked on a joint path 
toward free trade.”
lviii
 China’s imports of 
Chilean primary products have increased 
dramatically since the turn of the century. 
Engaging Chile with bilateral FTAs and state-
level deals has given China greater access to 
Chile’s natural resources, especially copper. 
China has become an integral part of Chile’s 
economy. China has achieved economic 
interconnectivity with Chile because of its 
adaptable strategies of bilateral engagement. 
 
China’s engagement with Venezuela  
 
Another example of China’s expedience in its 
natural resources acquisition in Latin America is 
in its relations with Venezuela. China’s 
expansion in bilateral trade and investment into 
Venezuela corresponds with the leadership of 
the revolutionary, anti-American president 
Hugo Chavez. Chavez offers China access to 
Venezuela’s petroleum as a way to increase 
economic and political relations between the 
two countries. This is driven by his desire to 
lower Venezuela’s dependence on the United 
States for consumption of its oil. With a foreign 
policy in Latin America based primarily on its 
quest for natural resources, China takes 
advantage of the political situation of Venezuela 
in order to access Venezuela’s vast reserves of 
petroleum. 
Although Venezuela does have large 
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reserves of other natural resources such as 
aluminum, iron, gold, and coal, by far its most 
important and abundant natural resource is 
petroleum. Venezuela has the second largest 
reserves of oil in the world, just behind Saudi 
Arabia Brief.
lix Venezuela is the seventh largest 
exporter of oil in the world.
lx Oil makes up 80 
percent of Venezuela’s total export revenue and 
contributes to approximately 50 percent of the 
central government’s income.
lxi It is responsible 
for about one-third of the country’s GDP.
lxii 
Including the deposits of hard-to-reach oil 
deposits in the Orinoco belt, Venezuela has 
approximately 211 billion barrels of proven oil 
reserves.
lxiii The majority of Venezuela’s oil is 
consumed by the United States. 
Venezuela’s leadership before Chavez 
showed little interest in economic and 
diplomatic relations with China, and there was 
little bilateral activity. However, Venezuela 
granted China diplomatic relations in 1974. The 
first visit to China by a Venezuelan president 
did not occur until 1981. 
Likewise, the first visit of a Chinese 
premier to Venezuela did not occur until 1985, 
11 years after Venezuela established 
diplomatic relations with China.
lxiv In 1996, 
Premier Li Peng visited Venezuela. With only 
three high-level visits up until 1999, relations 




The political relationship between China 
and Venezuela increased dramatically with the 
election of Hugo Chavez. Immediately after 
winning, Chavez made his first visit to the 
PRC in October 1999, and repeated visits six 
more times by 2011. Chavez’ statist, anti-free-
enterprise stance and desire to increase 
political and economic ties with China have 
strengthened the relationship of the two. In 
2001, China named Venezuela a “strategic 
partner,” signaling its desire for increased 
cooperation and bilateral progress. 
Because of Chavez, Venezuela has 
become an undesirable market for many 
Western companies. Starkly anti-capitalist, in 
2006 he nationalized all of the oil fields in the 
Orinoco region that were owned by foreign 
companies, resulting in an increased 
ownership stake from 40 percent to 60 percent 
for the central government.
lxvi The American 
companies ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil, 
Venezuela’s two biggest partners in heavy oil 
development at the time, decided to pull out of 
the country all together and settle it by 
international arbitration.
lxvii Seeing 
opportunities left by these private companies, 
China has worked to take advantage of the 
situation. 
Chavez has clearly positioned himself as 
both anti-American and pro-Chinese. In 2006, 
at a U.N. conference in New York, Chavez 
was quoted as saying "The American empire 
is doing all it can to consolidate its 
hegemonistic system of domination, and we 
cannot allow him [President George W. Bush] 
to do that. We cannot allow world dictatorship 
to be consolidated."
lxviii President Chavez 
blames the attempted pro-United States coup 
in 2002 on the United States government, and 
was angered that the United States 
diplomatically supported the usurping regime. 
Since the failed coup, Chavez’ anti- American 
sentiment has grown. Chavez desires to 
decrease Venezuela’s dependence on the U.S. 
as its most important importer of oil and 
would like to increase the prominence of the 
newly rising power, the PRC. In a 2004 state 
visit to Beijing, Chavez said “You should 
realize we’ve been producing and exporting 
petroleum for more than 100 years, but they 
were 100 years of domination by the United 
States. Now we are free and at the disposal of 
the great Chinese nation.”
lxix Statements like 
these give China confidence for aggressive 
development in the petroleum sector with 
Venezuela. 
However, there are significant obstacles 
to Chavez’ desire to meaningfully decrease 
Venezuela’s dependence on the Unites States. 
First is the U.S.’ close proximity to 
Venezuela. Just across the Caribbean, sending 
petroleum to the United States makes the most 
economic sense. That contrasts to China’s far 
distance and the fact that in order to reach 
China’s shores, ships must either go through 
the Panama Canal, around South American, or 
around Africa. Today, about 60 percent of 
Venezuela’s oil exports go to the United 
States, making Venezuelan oil imports 11 
percent of all oil imports to the United 
8




lxx Petroleos de Venezuela SA 
(PDVSA), Venezuela’s state owned oil 
company owns five oil refineries in the United 
States and has partial ownership in four 
through its U.S. subsidiary, CITGO.
lxxi
 
Nevertheless, Chavez has pledged to 
increase its supply of oil to the PRC 
significantly. In 2004, on a visit to Beijing, he 
told the Chinese that his country would put 
many of its oil facilities at the disposal of 
China, saying that Chinese firms would be 
allowed to operate 15 mature oil fields in the 
heart of Venezuela, capable of producing more 
than one billion barrels.
lxxii In 2008 he pledged 
that Venezuela would supply China with 
500,000 barrels of oil per day by 2009.lxxiii 
According to his statements, he actually came 
close, with 460,000 barrels.
lxxiv Thanks to 
Wikileaks, it has been discovered that much of 
this oil was sold to China at as little of a price 
as $5 per barrel when the market price was 
$78 per barrel.
lxxv According to an unnamed 
official at PDVSA, China then sold the cheap 
oil elsewhere at a “sizable” profit.
lxxvi The 
Chinese willingly accept the economic 
concessions that a politically driven Venezuela 
offer them. 
While the Venezuelan-produced statistics 
show 460,000 barrels per day in 2009, the 
Chinese- produced statistics show 
equivocating figures. For the first few months 
of 2010, Chinese figures showed that China 
was importing only an average of 132,000 
barrels per day in the first few months that 
year. Also, a U.S. Embassy cable published by 
the Spanish newspaper “el País” shows 
mismatches on Venezuelan data, citing a 
PDVSA official’s January 2010 estimates of 
oil exports to China that was nearly five times 
greater than the Chinese figures on such 
imports. To save face at not accomplishing his 
goal of 500,000 barrels per day, Chavez both 
offered oil to China at a steep discount and 
gave fake statistics. While the importance of 
bilateral trade between China and Venezuela 
has not reached the levels that Chavez 
purports it to, China does recognize the 
opportunities that an ideological pro-China 
government in Venezuela offers.
lxxvii
 
China has engaged Venezuela 
successfully with bilateral deals, almost 
always involving petroleum.   In 2007, China 
and Venezuela signed several bilateral 
agreements, the most important of which was 
a $6 billion development fund to deepen 
collaboration in the areas of energy, 
technology, and financing, particularly with 
regards to the Sino-Venezuelan oil trade.
lxxviii 
Of the total $6 billion, the Chinese 
Development Bank contributed $4 billion, 
while the Venezuela’s National Development 
Fund contributed $2 billion.
lxxix By 2011, the 
fund has reached $12 billion, with another $4 
billion coming from China and $2 billion from 
Venezuela.
lxxx Also in 2007, Venezuela signed 
agreements with the China National Petroleum 
Company (CNPC) for cooperative projects in 
the petroleum sector, most importantly an 
increased participation of CNPC in 
Venezuela’s Orinoco reserves. There have 
been over 300 bilateral investment 
commitments between the two countries, and 




China, with vast reserves of currency, 
takes advantage of Venezuela’s inability to 
attract meaningful private investment. Since 
private companies are often wary of 
investment into Venezuela, many development 
projects are underfunded. But with the 
political connections between China and 
Venezuela, China has more confidence in 
Venezuela’s ability to pay back its loans in oil. 
The China Development Bank (CDB) 
provided a soft loan in April 2010 to 
Venezuela of $20 billion, to be repaid over a 
ten year period, guaranteed by oil supplies.
lxxxii 
By trading its vast reserves of currency, China 
guarantees access to Venezuela’s oil. 
China has aggressively pursued state 
level deals with Venezuela for petroleum. 
Chávez offers China an opportunity to gain a 
foothold in the region- the goal of which in the 
end is greater energy and natural resource 
security. China obviously is using Venezuela’s 
political environment and statist leader to get 
access to their oil and has successfully taken 
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Exports of Latin American primary products 
to China have increased tremendously since the 
turn of the 21st century. China’s economic 
growth, powered by its high-tech exports and 
responsible governance, is the main reason for 
the uptake in these products. Latin America 
holds some of the world’s largest reserves of 
minerals, agricultural products, and fuel. Latin 
American economies have adapted to Chinese 
demand through developments of industries and 
the growth of transportation infrastructure. 
China works with Latin American governments 
to gain access to their natural resources with a 
state-specific, pragmatic approach, adapting 
itself to the economic and political 
considerations of the countries in question. 
China’s government also maintains oversight of 
the process of natural resource acquisition. The 
examples of China’s advancement with Chile 
and Venezuela show the Chinese government’s 
ability to work in starkly different economic, 
political, and ideological environments for the 
main purpose of the acquisition of natural 
resources. 
Due to China’s growing influence in the 
region, China’s expansion into Latin America 
may threaten United States hegemony in the 
Western Hemisphere. The United States has 
traditionally been the economic and political 
hegemonic power in the Western Hemisphere. 
While the United States was busy dealing with 
issues in the Middle East such as the Iraq War 
and the War in Afghanistan, the Chinese 
advanced into the United States’ “back yard.” 
China now holds more economic and political 
sway with a few important Latin American 
countries. The United States must develop a 
comprehensive strategy to deal with the growth 
of Chinese influence in its hemisphere. 
China’s advancement into Latin America 
could also be seen as a form of neocolonialism. 
While many Latin American countries have 
feared economic dominance by and dependence 
on the powerful Western states like the United 
States and Western Europe, they may find that 
China is no different. Latin American 
economies are becoming even more dependent 
on natural resource exports because of the 
growth of the Chinese presence. It is 
particularly ironic that the Venezuelans work to 
decrease their dependence on the United States 
by increasing their dependence on China. 
Although China’s government is in name 
Communist, its foreign policy is driven by its 
economic markets. It is also ironic that the 
world’s foremost Communist nation is now 
playing the role of a large, dominating 
economic power. Latin American nations 
should pay close attention to Chinese action in 
the region, and work to mitigate domination of 
their economies by China. 
China’s export driven economic growth 
has led it to Latin America for the acquisition of 
rich natural resources. Latin American countries 
have adapted to China’s demand with economic 
developments for the extraction and movement 
of natural resources to the Pacific Ocean. China 
has engaged the different players in the region 
with thoughtful and often opportunistic 
strategies and has gained significant influence 
in the region. It will be interesting to see the 
future of Sino-Latin American relations given 
the possible implications of China’s economic 
advancement in the region. 
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